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Losing Sticks from the Bundle: Incompatibility of 
Tenancy by the Entireties and Drug Forfeiture 
Laws 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. 1500 Lincoln Avenue, 1 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit enforced property 
forfeiture laws in accordance with the Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.2 The court's deci-
sion, while ostensibly protecting the innocent spouse's property 
interest, failed to reconcile competing concerns of drug forfei-
ture legislation and the restrictions in tenancy by the entire-
ties. 
1500 Lincoln Avenue involved forfeited real property which 
was held in tenancy by the entireties, a marital concurrent 
ownership that is indivisible except by death or joint agreement 
between spouses. Under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act, an owner of property subject to forfei-
ture may assert an innocent owner defense if the wrongdoer 
utilized joint property without the innocent owner's knowledge 
or consent.3 In 1500 Lincoln Avenue, the Third Circuit, by 
claiming a convicted drug dealer's interest, failed to protect his 
innocent spouse's full interest their entireties estate. 
Part II of this note examines tenancy by the entireties, 
forfeiture provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act, and the Third Circuit's attempt to 
reconcile the competing interests of both laws. Part III exam-
ines the Third Circuit's reasoning and compares its findings to 
existing case law and applicable state law. 
II. UNITED STATES V. 1500 LINCOLN AVENUE4 
A. Background 
1. History of tenancy by the entireties 
Tenancy by the entireties originated in the feudal system's 
1 949 F.2d n (3d Cir. 1991). 
2 21 U.S.C. § HH1(a)(7) (1988). 
a Id. 
4 949 F.2d n Uld Cir. 1991). 
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regime of land tenures and created concurrent marital property 
ownership with an indestructible right of survivorship.5 
The concept became part of English common law and was 
recognized as the only tenancy by which a husband and wife 
could concurrently hold land.6 The husband and wife were con-
sidered as one entity. 7 Thus, a single marital identity held the 
property in its entirety, without divisible shares.8 The tenancy 
could be created only by a husband and wife with unity of an 
ongoing marital relationship, time, title, interest and posses-
sion.9 It could be terminated only by death or divorce, with 
sole ownership vesting in the surviving spouse. 10 Until the 
late Nineteenth Century, a husband had exclusive control over 
property held in tenancy by the entireties. He could convey or 
encumber it without his wife's consent, subject only to such 
wife's right of survivorship. 11 
5 ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.5 (5th ed. 
1984); Oval A. Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 24, 24 (1951). Feudal 
land ownership and control was vested only in men, who were "presumably capable 
of bearing arms in war" to fight their lords' battles in exchange for their land. 
Women were considered as chattel and thus lacked legal capacity to assert own-
ership. Their identities upon marriage were merged and lost in their husbands' 
dominant identities. !d. at 24. In ironic contrast, community property's separate 
equal share principles have been traced to the Visigoths and other barbaric tribes 
that recognized the wife as an equal partner who shared everyday life and labor 
with her husband. 1 WILLIAM Q. DEFUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
§ 11 (1943). 
6 4A RICHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 'JI 620 (1991). Sir 
William Blackstone defined the tenancy by the entireties as it was described by Sir 
Thomas Littleton's land law treatise in the mid-Fifteenth Century: 
[I]f an estate in fee be given to a man and his wife, they are neither prop-
erly joint-tenants, nor tenants in common: for husband and wife being con-
sidered as one person in law, they cannot take the estate by moieties, but 
both are seised of the entirety, per tout et non per my: the consequence of 
which is, that neither the husband nor the wife can dispose of any part 
without the assent of the other, but the whole must remain to the survivor. 
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 181 (Edward 
Christian ed., Thomas B. Wait & Co. 1965) (1765). 
7 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 550-51 (3d ed. 
1990). "[I]n the eyes of the law husband and wife were but one person: they were 
two souls in one flesh." !d. "[T]he very being or legal existence of the woman is 
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into 
that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every 
thing .... " 2 BLACK&'TONE, supra note 6, at 442; see also Phipps, supra note 5, at 
24. 
8 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5. Any conveyance to a husband 
and wife was presumed to create a tenancy by the entireties, even if the convey-
ance stated a contrary intent. POWELL, supra note 6, '!I 620. 
9 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5; POWELL, supra note 6, 'JI 620. 
10 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5; POWELL, supra note 6, 'JI 620. 
11 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5; POWELL, supra note 6, '!J 620. 
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Tenancy by the entireties ownership was imported to the 
North American English colonies as part of the English com-
mon law. Nineteenth Century social attitudes, however, 
brought radical reformation to the legal status of women. 12 
These changes and the subsequent passage of women's proper-
ty acts prompted many jurisdictions to abolish tenancy by the 
entireties or modify it to allow mutual control by both spous-
es.13 England abolished it entirely in 1925 by passing its Law 
of Property Act which declared that husbands and wives were 
to be treated as two distinct persons when acquiring proper-
ty.14 
While some United States jurisdictions have taken steps to 
reform their tenancy by the entireties schemes, their treatment 
of the subject remains a patchwork of inconsistency. Twenty-
three states, including Pennsylvania, 15 still allow creation of a 
tenancy by the entireties. Remaining states have specifically 
rejected the concept or simply do not recognize it as a valid 
title for concurrent estates in land. 16 
As our society grows more complex, tenancy by the entire-
ties holdings create new dilemmas to be resolved by the courts. 
Drug enforcement forfeiture laws present are an example of 
such a dilemma. 
According to Blackstone, restricting a woman's right to control property was for her 
protection. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 442; Ruth B. Ginsburg, Gemlr-r and the 
Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975). These notions were refuted by Nine-
teenth Century philosopher John Stuart Mill, who found such inequality of power 
to be "one of the chief hindrances to human improvement." ld. at 2. 
12 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note fi, § 5.5; POWELL, supra note 6, 'lJ fi20. 
13 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.fi; POWELL, supra note 6, 'lJ 622. 
14 POWELL, supra note 6, 'll 620 n.7. 
15 In re Moorehead's Estate, 137 A. 802, 806 (Pa. 1927). See infra text ac-
companying notes 60 and 61. 
16 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5 n.3; United States v. 15621 S.W. 
209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1fill, 1519 n.9 (11th Cir. 1990). The following jurisdictions 
still recognize tenancy by the entireties: Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, District of 
Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylva-
nia, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. ld.; see also Eric 
G. Zajac, Tenancy by the Entireties and Federal Civil Forfeiture Under the Crime 
Abuse and Control Act: A Clash of Titans, fi4 U. PITT. L. REV. 55::l, fi78 n.166 
(1993). It is interesting to note the pattern of English common law influence. All 
but three states are east of the Mississippi and 10 states were part of the original 
Thirteen Colonies. Paradoxically, Alaska and Hawaii both achieved statehood only 
within the last 40 years and established their statutory codes in a cultural and 
social environment far removed from English common law. 
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2. The forfeiture provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act17 
The indivisible nature of property title held in tenancy by 
the entireties has created difficulties in applying property for-
feiture laws used to punish persons convicted of drug-related 
crimes. 
In 1984, Congress attempted to strengthen sanctions in 
existing drug traffic legislation by adding property forfeiture 
provisions. The new amendment allows the federal government 
to claim the property interest of any person convicted of a drug-
related crime who used the property while committing the 
underlying crime. 18 Legislative history of that legislation con-
firms clear congressional intent to attack illegal drug trade 
through strong economic sanctions that would have an immedi-
ate and onerous effect on the convicted party. 19 
At the same time, Congress also provided an innocent 
owner defense to protect property owners who did not know 
their property was being used in the commission of drug-relat-
ed crimes.20 In United States v. 1500 Lincoln Avenue,21 the 
Third Circuit applied the innocent owner defense and attempt-
ed to reconcile the Act with tenancy by the entireties. 
B. Facts of 1500 Lincoln Avenue 
A. Leonard Bernstein, who owned and operated a pharma-
cy in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, pled guilty to nine drug-related 
charges stemming from the illegal sale of pharmaceutical drugs 
at his pharmacy.22 Pursuant to § 881(a)(7), the federal govern-
ment filed a forfeiture complaint for his interest in the real 
17 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). 
18 Section 88l(a) states, in part: "The following shall be subject to forfeiture 
to the United States and no property right shall exist in them: .... (7) All real 
property, including any right, title, and interest ... which is used, or intended to 
be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a 
violation of this subchapter .... " 
19 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Scss. 191 (198:i), rPprintf'd in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. :ns2, 3374 ("Profit is the motivation for this criminal activity, and it 
is through economic power that it is sustained and grows."). 
20 ld. "[No I property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of 
an interest of an owner, hy reason of any act or omission established by that own-
er to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that 
owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988). 
21 949 F.2d n Uld Cir. 1991). 
22 949 F.2d at 7fi. 
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property at 1500 Lincoln Avenue containing the pharmacy. The 
government noted that the property was jointly owned by Mr. 
Bernstein and his wife, Linda Bernstein, in tenancy by the 
entireties. 23 The government's action sought to convert the 
interest to a tenancy in common. 
To preserve her interest in the property, Mrs. Bernstein 
claimed the innocent owner defense available under§ 881(a)(7). 
Accordingly, she sought to have the complaint dismissed based 
on the indivisible nature of her interest.24 The district court 
agreed, finding that under Pennsylvania common law, a tenant 
by the entireties had undivided title to the property that could 
not be severed by illegal activities on the land.25 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit reversed. The case was remanded to the district 
court to determine if Mr. Bernstein's interest was subject to 
forfeiture. 26 Subject to this determination, the Third Circuit 
concluded that Mrs. Bernstein would be entitled to a life estate 
in the property with the right to fee simple title only if her 
husband predeceased her.27 
C. The Third Circuit's Reasoning 
The Third Circuit reasoned that the life estate interpreta-
tion satisfied both the forfeiture purpose of§ 881 and its provi-
sion to protect the innocent owner's interest in the property.28 
In contrast, the trial court's decision to deny forfeiture frustrat-
ed enforcement of the statute's economic sanctions.29 
The Third Circuit looked to the legislative history of§ 881 
and found a compelling public policy in enforcing economic 
sanctions to fight a drug trade fueled by massive assets.30 
Such intent is reflected in the following language of the Senate: 
"[T]he traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment 
are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable 
23 !d. at 74. 
24 !d. at 75. 
25 !d. The district court maintained that a spouse's innocent owner defense 
bars civil forfeiture actions against property held in tenancy by the entirety. 
26 !d. at 78. 
27 !d. 
28 !d. at 77-78. 
29 !d. at 78. 
30 !d. at 76-77; Caplin & Drysdale Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 
631 (1989); S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1983), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374. 
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trade in dangerous drugs which, with its inevitable attendant 
violence, is plaguing the country."31 
In deciding as it did, the Third Circuit rejected altematives 
offered by other courts. For example, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that no portion 
of a tenancy by the entireties estate may be forfeited if there 
was an innocent concurrent owner.32 The Third Circuit consid-
ered the Eleventh Circuit's remedy of a lis pendens on the 
guilty spouse's interest to be difficult to enforce at some future 
time.33 The Third Circuit reasoned: "[W]e do not see what pur-
pose would be served by postponing adjudication of the 
government's right to forfeiture ... rather than adjudicating 
that issue when the evidence is still fresh."34 
Furthermore, the court reasoned that an exclusive life 
estate, with the right to fee simple if she survived her husband, 
gave the innocent spouse the same rights she enjoyed as a 
tenant by the entireties.35 Accordingly, the court adopted the 
federal government's position that while Mr. Bemstein's prop-
erty interest was subject to forfeiture, Mrs. Bernstein should 
still be entitled to exclusive use of the property during her 
lifetime, with right to fee simple absolute if she survived her 
husband.36 
III. ANALYSIS 
While the Third Circuit's reasoning appears to be facially 
equitable, there are flaws in its treatment of an innocent 
spouse's property interest. First, the decision is at odds with 
other judicial decisions involving similar facts. 37 Second, it is 
31 S. REP No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1983), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374. See also Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 630, in which 
the Court refused to exempt assets from forfeiture to be used to pay attorneys 
fees, and noted that Congress has already underscored the compelling public inter-
est in stripping criminals of their undeserved economic power, and part of that 
undeserved power may be the ability to command high-priced legal talent. 
32 15621 S. W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1514 (quoting Joint Explanatory 
Statement of Titles I & II, 124 CONG. REc. S17647, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
9518, 9522). 
33 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d at 78. 
34 ld. at 7R. 
35 [d. 
::!6 ld. 
37 See, e.g., United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d ::!43, 352 (6th Cir. 
1990); United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1512 (11th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Property Entitled in the Names of Alexander M. Toki and 
Elizabeth M. Toki, 779 F. Supp. 1272, 1281-82 (D. Hawaii 1991); United States v. 
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inconsistent with Pennsylvania common law decisions that 
address the indivisible unity inherent in a tenancy by the en-
tireties estate. 
A. Decisions in Conflict with the Third Circuit 
The district court in 1500 Lincoln Avenue dismissed the 
forfeiture action, based on another appellate decision in United 
States v. 15621 S. W. 209th Avenue.38 In 15621 S. W. 209th 
Avenue, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit found it impossible to effectuate forfeiture of the guilty 
spouse's interest in a tenancy by the entireties estate without 
interfering with the innocent spouse's interest.39 The facts of 
the 15621 S. W. 209th Avenue case were substantially similar to 
those present in 1500 Lincoln Avenue. The wife was an inno-
cent owner by tenancy in the entireties of a family residence 
used by her husband to conduct illicit drug sales.40 
The Eleventh Circuit, in analyzing § 881, found "the gov-
ernment obtains through forfeiture whatever interest remains 
in the property after the innocent owner's interest has been 
excepted."41 Since a tenant by the entireties owns an indivisi-
ble "right, title and interest" with his or her spouse, there is no 
measurable interest left solely to a tenant that could be forfeit-
ed under § 881.42 The court declared that the government 
could prevent alienation of the guilty husband's interest in the 
estate by filing a lis pendens against the property.43 Should 
both husband and wife terminate the estate by agreement or 
divorce, or if the guilty husband survives his wife, the govern-
ment is able to recover its interest in the guilty husband's 
share.44 
The Third Circuit, however, rejected this solution as un-
wieldy and possibly unenforceable. It maintained that under a 
lis pendens the government would have to "prove the underly-
ing criminal conduct long after its occurred."45 This concern is 
tenuous, since Mr. Bernstein was indicted, pled guilty, and is 
1188.5 S.W. 46 St., 751 F. Supp. 1588 (S.D. Fla. 1990) . 
. '38 894 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1990). 
39 Id. at 1512. 
40 ld. at 1513. 
41 Id. at 1516. 
42 ld. 
43 Id. at 1516 n.6. 
44 ld. 
45 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d at 78. 
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now serving a ten-year prison term.46 Consequently, the re-
quired criminal conduct is a matter of record, and no further 
proof is necessary to enforce the lis pendens. 
While the Third Circuit showed concern for enforcement of 
a forfeiture statute, its own life estate solution does not prevent 
Mr. Bernstein from receiving benefits from the property. Mr. 
Bernstein will still indirectly benefit, through his marital rela-
tionship, from profits flowing from his wife's life estate. Assum-
ing the marriage continues after Mr. Bernstein is released from 
prison, he will be able to share financial support that Mrs. 
Bernstein is able to provide through her interest in the land. 
The property may even provide living quarters for the 
Bernsteins. 
In addition, the 1500 Lincoln Avenue court and the govern-
ment erroneously relied upon a Sixth Circuit decision. 47 That 
decision actually supported the position taken by the Eleventh 
Circuit in 15621 S. W. 209th Avenue.48 In United States v. 
2525 Leroy Lane, the property at issue had been sold, and the 
court determined that the government was entitled to forfeit 
the guilty spouse's interest in the proceeds.49 Nevertheless, 
the Sixth Circuit noted: 
[T]he Government may properly acquire only the interest 
which Mr. Marks [the guilty spouse] held as cotenant by the 
entireties. However, the Government cannot occupy the posi-
tion of Mr. Marks ... since the estate is founded on marital 
union, and the Government obviously cannot assume the role 
of spouse to Mrs. Marks. By acquiring Mr. Marks's interest in 
the entireties estate, the Government is precluded from ob-
taining Mr. Marks's interest in the property unless and until 
Mrs. Marks predeceases her husband or the entireties estate 
is otherwise terminated by dissolution of the marriage or joint 
conveyance. 5° 
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit found the Eleventh Circuit's lis 
pendens solution to be appropriate protection of the 
government's right to acquire an interest in real property held 
46 !d. at 75. 
47 !d. at 75; see also United States v. 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d :148, ::l51 
(6th Cir. 1990). 
48 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 851-52. 
49 !d. at 852. 
50 Id. 
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as an estate by the entireties. 51 
Similarly, federal district courts have relied on the Sixth 
Circuit and Eleventh Circuit decisions in preventing termina-
tion by forfeiture of tenancy by the entireties estates.52 The 
district court in 11885 S. W. 46 Street declared that in an en-
tireties estate, no unilateral act of a spouse could alienate, 
encumber, or forfeit the property.53 Accordingly, it found the 
government could not forfeit any interest in the family home 
used by the husband in a cocaine transaction without his wife's 
knowledge. 54 The unities of time, title, interest and possession 
could not be destroyed by the husband's crime to create a ten-
ancy in common. 55 
In a comparable case, the district court in United States v. 
Toki precluded government forfeiture of any property held as 
tenancy by the entireties where there was an innocent co-own-
er.56 The Toki court closely followed both the Eleventh 
Circuit's decision in 15621 S. W. 209 Avenue and the Sixth 
Circuit's decision in 2525 Leroy Lane.57 It concluded that the 
federal government only acquires the right to file a lis pendens 
against a property held in tenancy by the entireties, which 
ripens upon lawful termination of the estate by the parties' 
mutual agreement, divorce or death.58 
B. Applicability of Pennsylvania State Law 
Not only did the Third Circuit reject other courts' deci-
sions, it failed to interpret correctly Pennsylvania's common 
law principles. It is well settled law that in determining prop-
erty rights a federal court must look to appropriate state law, 
even if federal statutes or the federal government are substan-
tially involved in the cause of action.59 
51 ld. 
52 See, e.g., United States v. Property Entitled in the Names of Alexander 
M. Toki and Elizabeth M. Toki, 779 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Hawaii 1991); United States 
v. 11885 S.W. 46 St., 751 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1990). 
53 11885 S.W. 46 St., 751 F. Supp. at 1539. 
54 ld. at 1539-40. 
55 ld. 
56 779 F. Supp. at 1281-82. This decision did not determine whether or not 
Mrs. Toki was an innocent owner with regard to her husband's convicted drug 
activity. ld. 
57 ld. 
58 ld. 
59 Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 
363, 378 (1977) ("[P]roperty ownership is not governed by a general federal law, 
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Pennsylvania common law continues to embrace the legal 
fiction created by a tenancy by the entireties, notwithstanding 
the realities of modern-day independent spousal rights. 60 
"[T]he legal unity of husband and wife ... is a unity which 
must continue to be recognized, however ... modern laws en-
large the separate rights and privileges of each."61 Husband 
and wife are treated as one person, with each spouse able to 
enjoy the property in its entirety and have the right of survi-
vorship, but "neither one has any individual portion which can 
be alienated or separated, or which can be reached by the cred-
itors of either spouse."62 
Under Pennsylvania common law, neither spouse may 
compel partition or sever a tenancy by the entireties through a 
unilateral conveyance or act by one party. The law also empha-
sizes that the sole right of a spouse's creditor is a "presently 
unenforceable lien upon that spouse's expectancy of survivor-
ship-a lien that becomes enforceable only when the other 
spouse dies."63 
Pennsylvania courts, however, have recognized an implied 
mutual agreement to terminate the tenancy under certain cir-
cumstances.64 According to the court in Clingerman v. 
Sadowski, a spouse's misappropriation of an entireties estate 
which excludes the other spouse from its use and enjoyment is 
an offer to terminate the estate.65 If the other spouse initiates 
suit to reclaim his or her rightful interest, this response is con-
but rather by the laws of the several States."); 1.5621 S.W. 209 Ave., 894 F.2d at 
1517-18. 
60 United States v. 717 Woodward St., 804 F. Supp. 716, 723 (E.D. Pa. 
1992); Clingerman v. Sadowski, 519 A.2d 378, 380-81 (Pa. 1986) (paraphrasing 
LADNER ON CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA, § 1.08 (4th ed. 1979). 
61 In re Moorehead's Estate, 137 A. 802, 806 (Pa. 1927). Pennsylvania's 
devotion to women's equality in law is exemplified hy the following statute passed 
in 1872 as part of the state's Married Women's Property Acts: "From and after 
passage of this act, all contracts made by married women, in the purchase of sew-
ing machines for their own use, shall be valid and binding, without the necessity 
of the husband joining in the same." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 33 (1964) repealed 
by Act of February 11, 1982, P.L. :n, No. 19, §1. 
62 Madden v. Gossztonyi Savings & Trust Co., 200 A. 624, 627-28 (Pa. 
1938); see also Beihl v. Martin, 84 A. 953, 957 (Pa. 1912) (property held as an 
estate by the entireties was exempt from husband's bankruptcy). 
63 Napotnik v. Equibank & Parkvale Savings Ass'n, 679 F.2d 316, 319 (3d 
Cir. 1982). Joint debts, however, may be reached by a creditor filing a lien on the 
jointly owned property. ld. 
64 Clingerman, 519 A.2d at 381. 
65 ld. 
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sidered acceptance of the offer to terminate. 66 
In addition, property held by tenancy in the entireties is 
exempt from execution and sale pursuant to bankruptcy by one 
spouse. To allow enforcement of such an action would be "the 
taking of the property of one to pay the debts of another."67 
While the "unity" concept of tenancy by the entireties often re-
sults in unfair treatment of creditors,68 courts try to protect 
against unfairness by scrutinizing such transfers for evidence 
of fraudulent conveyance by debtors to exempt valuable proper-
ty assets. 69 
Accordingly, the district court's decision in 1500 Lincoln 
Avenue that precluded destruction of the unity of a tenancy by 
the entireties through forfeiture is consistent with state com-
mon law principles that forbid similar interference by a credi-
tor or bankruptcy proceeding against one spouse. Moreover, Mr. 
Bernstein's unlawful use of his pharmacy for unauthorized 
pharmaceutical sales does not constitute a misappropriation or 
an exclusion of his wife's interest consistent with the 
Clingerman implied agreement rule. 70 
In contrast, the Third Circuit's holding which allowed Mrs. 
Bernstein a life estate in the subject property interfered with 
her interest in a manner inconsistent with Pennsylvania com-
mon law. While the Third Circuit rejected the government's 
argument that the tenancy be changed to a tenancy in com-
mon, 71 its decision had the actual effect of severing the entire-
ties estate by reducing Mrs. Bernstein's property interest. She 
retained her right to survivorship, but she had fewer rights to 
66 Id. 
67 Beihl, 84 A. at 953. 
68 See generally James J. Vlasic, Tenancy by the Entireties: A Debtor's Ha-
ven, 65 MICH. B.J. 162-64 (1986). 
69 See 2525 Leroy Lane, 910 F.2d at 349 ("Creation of an entireties estate 
just prior to commission of a crime could, as in a bankruptcy context, be chal-
lenged in certain instances as a fraudulent conveyance."). 
70 Clingerman and related cases involve highly mobile personal property held 
as tenancy by the entireties, such as the bank accounts, art collections, and similar 
assets. Clingerman, 519 A.2d at :~80. It is far more difficult to misappropriate real 
property. 
71 But compare an alternate solution proposed to amend § 881(a)(7) to 
change a title held as tenancy in the entireties to tenancy in common if there is 
an innocent owner-spouse. Eric G. Zajac, Tenancy by the Entireties and Federal 
Civil Forfeiture Under the Crime Abuse and Control Act: A Clash of Titans, 54 U. 
PJTI. L. REV. 553 (1993). While this alternative solves the problem presented by 
the drug crime forfeiture laws, it does not solve similar conflicts with bankruptcy 
and creditors' rights. 
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the property than she did previously as a tenant by the entire-
ties. The court's solution did not provide for any possible agree-
ment between the government and Mrs. Bemstein to sell the 
property and divide the proceeds. Rather if she attempted to 
sell or lease her life estate interest, she would receive substan-
tially less than she would in a lease or sale of a fee simple 
interest. This conclusion is rooted in the fact that any buyer or 
lessee would face the uncertain problem of possible reversion to 
the government if Mrs. Bemstein predeceased her husband. 
Thus, the Third Circuit solution compromises the property's 
value and Mrs. Bemstein's fundamental right of alienability. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Tenancy by the entireties is based on a fictional unity that 
is inconsistent with the complexities of modern law, particular-
ly the property forfeiture laws discussed herein. As a result, 
courts are unable to reach equitable results in cases involving 
tenancy by the entireties. Consequently, this vestige from the 
feudal system cannot always function effectively as a means of 
modem concurrent ownership. 
The Third Circuit misapplied common law tenancy by the 
entireties rules in actually terminating an estate-an act that 
can only be done by the husband and wife who created the 
estate. While the court had a compelling interest in controlling 
drug traffic through enforcement of§ 881, the fact remains that 
its holding ignored applicable state law that governs real prop-
erty ownership. Such a holding demonstrates how tenancy by 
the entireties creates a dilemma. This dilemma is nonexistent 
with other forms of concurrent ownership that are more consis-
tent with current social and legal realities. 
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